Mike Scherzer, Author at Scherzer International

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So far Mike Scherzer has created 400 blog entries.

California’s marijuana laws present challenges for employers

Even for those not partaking in marijuana, the various California laws regulating its use can be confusing – particularly for employers.

The trend in state legislatures to permit the recreational and/or medicinal use of marijuana began with California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, which allowed state residents to use the drug for medical purposes and decriminalized possession of less than 28 grams. Complicating the matter, however: marijuana use remains prohibited by federal law.

With limited use of marijuana legal in the state, how can employers find out about a worker’s use of the drug or limit it without running afoul of state law?

Employers have two options, either try to get their hands on historical information, such as criminal convictions, or seek out current input via drug testing.

Criminal history related to drugs in many instances is off-limits for employers. Job applicants cannot be required to disclose an arrest that did not result in a conviction or participation in a pretrial or post-trial diversion program. Any criminal history that has been expunged, sealed, or dismissed will be unavailable as are marijuana-related convictions dating back more than two years.

While California has not banned the box for private employers, local jurisdictions such as San Francisco have, requiring employers to wait until after a live interview or determining that an applicant meets the qualifications for the position before inquiring into criminal history. Background checks – whether performed in-house or by a third party – require compliance with federal law (the Fair Credit and Reporting Act (FCRA) as well as California’s counterpart, the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (although the legality of the state statute is unclear, see story below for more detail). And such investigations into applicants’ history are a current target for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission – which has filed multiple lawsuits (https://www.scherzer.com/eeoc-loses-again-in-challenge-to-background-checks/) against employers alleging their background checks constitute disparate impact discrimination against protected groups like African-Americans – and a popular basis for class actions. Recent cases have settled with multi-million awards, including a $2.5 million payout by Domino’s Pizza and a $6.8 million deal between Publix Super Markets and a class of applicants alleging the company violated the FCRA.

Drug tests can be viable option for employers. Once a job offer has been made, an employer may require an applicant to pass a drug test as a condition of employment (as long as all potential employees are subject to the same requirement). After a worker has been hired, drug tests may be used if an employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee is under the influence. Certain jobs – such as those in the transportation industry like truck drivers – may permit such testing more freely. If a test comes back positive, employers do have the discretion to discipline, terminate, or choose not to hire an applicant even if the individual legally holds a medical marijuana card issued by the state. In addition, despite the requirements under the Americans With Disabilities Act and California state law to provide reasonable accommodations to employees considered disabled, neither federal nor state law requires employers to permit marijuana use as such an accommodation.

September 23rd, 2015|Criminal Activity, Employment Decisions|

Company fined $600,000 for I-9 violations

A recent decision from the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer provides an important reminder: keep up on I-9 compliance or face a sizable civil penalty.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1324(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, employers must examine and document the identity and immigration documents of employees. Since the Act’s 1986 enactment, the Employment Eligibility Verification Form, colloquially known as the I-9, is used to verify the identity and employment authorization of individuals hired for work in the United States. Both the employee and the employer must complete the form. In addition, employers must examine the worker’s documentation establishing his or her identity and employment authorization to determine if the documents “reasonably appear to be genuine.”

In 2013, the agency transitioned employers to use of a new form with additional fields (including employee telephone number and e-mail address), new formatting, and clarified instructions. Failure to complete an I-9 form can lead to an enforcement action from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with penalties ranging from $110 to $1,100 per form.

Recently, a California-based event design and construction company learned that lesson the hard way when the agency charged the employer with 818 violations of the statute, seeking $812,665.25 in civil penalties.

The company’s “employment verification procedures are sufficiently defective to foreclose a claim of either good faith or substantial compliance,” Administrative Law Judge Ellen K. Thomas wrote, finding that the company engaged in the majority of the violations alleged.

The judge found most of the violations occurred in Section 2 of the I-9, which requires a representative from the employer to review the documents presented by the employee to prove identity and work authorization and then sign, under penalty of perjury, that he or she reviewed the documents. ICE found that 797 of the company’s I-9 forms were left blank. Characterizing the employer attestation in Section 2 as “the very heart” of the verification process, the ALJ fined Hartmann $700 for each violation, or $557,900.

Judge Thomas found other serious violations in the company’s I-9 forms, including failing to ensure that in Section 1 employees checked a box attesting to status as a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien authorized to work (with the need to add an alien registration number if either lawful permanent resident or alien authorized to work were selected). Many employees also failed to sign Section 1, the court found, and the company neglected to have employees list a driver’s license expiration date in Section 2.

The company tried to mitigate the fine by arguing that it improved its processes after receiving notice from ICE, but the judge was not persuaded, particularly as the company made no effort until after the federal agency came knocking. “

[T]he company does appear to need additional motivation to conform its employment verification processes to what the law requires,” Judge Thomas wrote, issuing a total fine of $605,250.

To avoid a similar fate, compliance with I-9 requirements should be taken seriously and employers should ensure that the appropriate forms are being correctly filled out.

Read the decision.

September 23rd, 2015|Employment Decisions|

Right to be Forgotten movement gains backers in the U.S.

Seeking to expand recognition of the Right to be Forgotten to the United States, a consumer group has filed a petition with the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) requesting that Google be required to remove links upon request.

Last year, the European Court of Justice ordered Google to remove links about the financial history of a Spanish attorney, finding that the links to stories about his debts were “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive,” establishing the Right to be Forgotten (“RTBF”). Over the last 12 months, Google has received 274,462 removal requests and evaluated 997,008 URLs for removal from its search results.

In the hopes of bringing the RTBF to the United States, Consumer Watchdog recently filed a petition with the FTC. The group argued that by providing the ability to request removal of links to European consumers in Europe, Google engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Not offering Americans the right to request removal – while providing it to millions of users across Europe – is unfair, the group argued to the FTC. And Google’s claims in its privacy policy that “

[p]rotecting the privacy and security” of customer information “is a top priority,” are deceptive because the company limits protections by denying the RTBF, the consumer group added.

Consumer Watchdog listed several examples of U.S. citizens who have been harmed without the RTBF in this country, ranging from a guidance counselor who was fired after photos of her as a lingerie model from 20 years prior surfaced online to a woman whose mug shot appeared online after she was arrested defending herself against an abusive boyfriend. The group also told the FTC that Google already removes certain types of links from search results in this country (such as revenge porn), meaning it has the capability to remove other links as well.

“As clearly demonstrated by its willingness to remove links to certain information when requested in the United States, Google could easily offer the RTBF or the Right To Relevancy request option to Americans,” Consumer Watchdog wrote. “It unfairly and deceptively opts not to do so.”

The RTBF doesn’t implicate First Amendment concerns or constitute censorship, the group said, because the content remains on the Internet. The right “simply allows a person to request that links from their name to data that is inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive be removed from search results,” according to the petition. “Americans deserve the same ability to make such a privacy-protecting request and have it honored.”

Further, the right isn’t automatic. “Removal won’t always happen, but the balance Google has found between privacy and the public’s right to know demonstrates Google can make the RTBF or Right To Relevancy work in the United States,” Consumer Watchdog concluded.

Meanwhile, the issue of expanding the RTBF has also come up in Europe. In July, a French regulatory authority ordered Google to remove all the links from its search pages including Google.com in the U.S. – not just the European pages. Google refused to comply and filed an appeal of the order. “We believe that no one country should have the authority to control what content someone in a second country can access,” Google’s global privacy counsel Peter Fleischer wrote on the company’s blog.

Read Consumer Watchdog’s petition to the FTC.

September 23rd, 2015|Criminal Activity, Educational Series, Employment Decisions|

DOL offers new guidance on old question of employee or independent contractor

For the last few years, one of the top priorities for the Department of Labor (the “DOL”) has been the fight against the misclassification of employees as independent contractors. In the agency’s latest effort, it released new guidance for employers when classifying workers, using six factors to consider.

The Administrator’s Interpretation 2015-1 focuses on the issue of whether the worker is “economically dependent on the employer or truly in business for him or herself.” The more the worker relies upon an employer for income stream, business skills, and supplies, the more likely he or she is an employee – and entitled to all of the benefits included in that classification, such as overtime or worker’s compensation.

In “The Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s ‘Suffer or Permit’ Standard in the Identification of Employees Who Are Misclassified as Independent Contractors,” the DOL started with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (the “FLSA”) definition of “employ:” “to suffer or permit to work.” Under this broad definition, “most workers are employees,” the agency stated unequivocally.

With that in mind, the DOL turned to the six factors of the economic realities test commonly used by courts when considering whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The agency noted that the labels used by an employer are not determinative of the nature of the relationship and neither are tax filings.

“All of the factors must be considered in each case, and no one factor (particularly the control factor) is determinative of whether a worker is an employee,” the DOL wrote. “Moreover, the factors themselves should not be applied in a mechanical fashion, but with an understanding that the factors are indicators of the broader concept of economic dependence. Ultimately, the goal is not simply to tally which factors are met, but to determine whether the worker is economically dependent on the employer (and thus its employee) or is really in business for him or herself (and thus its independent contractor).”

Is the work an integral part of the employer’s business? If a worker is economically dependent upon the employer, he or she is likely an employee, while a “true independent contractor’s work, on the other hand, is unlikely to be integral to the employer’s business.” Recognizing the increasing use of telecommuting and other flexible work schedules in today’s economy, the DOL added that work can be integral even if it is performed away from the employer’s premises.

The second factor considers whether the worker’s managerial skill affects the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss. A worker in business for him or herself not only has the opportunity to profit but also to experience a loss, the DOL explained. The question isn’t whether a worker is on the job more hours or earns more money but if the worker makes decisions and exercises skill and initiative – hiring other workers or advertising his services, for example – to move the business forward.

In the third factor, the worker’s relative investment as compared to the employer’s investment should be evaluated. “The worker should make some investment (and therefore undertake at least some risk for a loss) in order for there to be an indication that he or she is an independent business,” according to the guidance. Simply purchasing tools or other equipment may not constitute an investment, the agency added, when considered relative to the employer’s investment.

Fourth: does the work performed require special skill and initiative? Technical skills alone will not indicate that a worker is an independent contractor, the DOL said. Instead, business skills, judgment, and initiative should be evaluated. For example, a highly skilled carpenter who provides his services to a construction company may simply be providing skilled labor as an employee. On the other hand, if the carpenter decides which jobs to take, advertises his services, and determines what materials to order, he is more likely to be classified as an independent contractor.

The length of the relationship between the worker and the employer is the focus of factor five. A permanent or indefinite relationship signals an employee, the DOL said. “After all, a worker who is truly in business for him or herself will eschew a permanent or indefinite relationship with an employer and the dependence that comes with such permanence or indefiniteness,” the agency wrote. The length of time should be considered in the context of the industry, however – seasonal positions may not always indicate an independent contractor relationship, for example.

In the sixth factor, the DOL advised employers to think about control. While the control factor should not receive more weight than the other factors in the economic realities test, the nature and degree of the employer’s control should be considered in light of the ultimate determination whether the worker is economically dependent on the employer or an independent contractor. Employers do not need to look over a worker’s shoulder every day to make them an employee, the guidance cautioned, as technological advancements permit many employees to work off-site and unsupervised.

Employers should review the new guidance and be prepared for agency oversight on the issue of worker classification, keeping in mind that the DOL repeatedly emphasized that “most workers are employees.”

Read the Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1.

September 23rd, 2015|Educational Series, Employment Decisions|

Revised FCRA Summary of Rights form released

Did you know that a revised version of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) Summary of Rights form was released a few months ago?

If the answer is “no,” don’t worry. The form was not published in the Federal Register and appeared under the radar without an announcement.

The FCRA mandates that employers are required to provide a disclosure and obtain written authorization from any applicant or employee prior to conducting a background check. If the employer decides to take an “adverse action” against the applicant or employee based on the results of the background check, the employer must provide the individual with a copy of the background check and the Summary of Rights form under the FCRA.

The revised form does not require a lot of adjustments for employers. Some of the government addresses found on the last page were changed and all references to Maine’s laws were removed. Earlier this year, the state repealed its mini-FCRA to adopt the federal FCRA.

View the new Summary of Rights form.

September 23rd, 2015|Educational Series, Employment Decisions|

NYC Commission issues legal enforcement guidance on employment credit checks

The New York City Commission recently issued interpretive legal enforcement guidance clarifying some of the exemptions in the City’s Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act (“SCDEA”), as well as recordkeeping requirements and penalties.

As we reported previously, effective September 3, 2015, the SCDEA amends the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”) to make requesting and using consumer credit history for hiring and other employment purposes, with certain exceptions, an unlawful discriminatory practice.

The SCDEA defines “consumer credit history” as an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or payment history, as indicated by: (a) a consumer credit report; (b) credit score; or (c) information an employer obtains directly from the individual regarding details about (1) credit accounts, including the individual’s number of credit accounts, late or missed payments, charged-off debts, items in collections, credit limit, prior credit report inquiries, or (2) bankruptcies, judgments or liens.”

It remains unclear whether the law bans only inquiries, but not public record searches, for bankruptcies, judgments or liens. Under the SCDEA, a consumer credit report includes “any written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or credit history,” and given the broad scope of “any written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency” caution should be taken regarding these searches and even for civil litigation, as such public records may reveal credit-related information that New York City employers are prohibited from using.

While the SCDEA generally establishes eight categories of exemptions, such as those of individuals required to be bonded under city, state, or federal law which are self-explanatory, there has been much speculation as to the scope of others. In its FAQs, the guidance specifically provides that the exemptions do not cover most low-level employees including, but not limited to, bank tellers, cashiers, salespeople, clerical workers, administrative staff, restaurant/bar workers, and private security employees.

Interpretation about non-clerical positions having regular access to trade secrets is also included in the guidance. The SCDEA defines “trade secrets” as “information that: (a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means, by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy; and (c) can reasonably be said to be the end product of significant innovation.”

The SCDEA limits the trade secret definition to exclude “general proprietary company information such as handbooks and policies” and “access to or the use of client, customer, or mailing lists.” Consistent with this definition and the broad scope of the NYCHRL, “trade secrets” do not include information such as recipes, formulas, customer lists, processes, and other information regularly collected in the course of business or regularly used by entry-level and non-salaried employees and supervisors or managers of such employees.

The guidance emphasizes that all exemptions to coverage under the SCDEA’s anti-discrimination provisions are to be construed narrowly. Employers may claim an exemption to defend against liability, but they have the burden of proving the exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. No exemption applies to an entire employer or industry–exemptions apply only to positions or roles, and not to individual applicants or employees. The law does permits employers to request credit information in response to any lawful subpoena, court order, or law enforcement investigation.

An employer claiming an exemption must show that the position or role falls under one of the eight general position categories referenced previously. Employers availing themselves of the exemptions should inform applicants or employees of the claimed exemption, and should also keep a record of their use of such exemptions for a period of five years from the date an exemption is used. Keeping an exemption log will help the employer respond to the Commission’s requests for information.

The guidance sets forth civil penalties for violations of the law (up to $250,000 for willful, wanton, or malicious violations, and up to $125,000 for other violations) in addition to other remedies available under the NYCHRL.

Read the SCDEA, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-102(29), 8-107(9)(d), (24); Local Law No. 37 (2015)

Access the interpretive guidance, FAQs and other information about the credit check law here.

September 23rd, 2015|Legislation|

FTC launches new resource for identity theft victims

The FTC has launched IdentityTheft.gov, a new resource that makes it easier for identity theft victims to report and recover from the crime. A Spanish version of the site is available at RobodeIdentidad.gov.

The new website provides an interactive checklist that explains the recovery process and helps victims understand the steps that should be taken upon learning that their identity has been stolen. It also provides sample letters and other helpful resources. In addition, the site offers specialized tips for specific forms of identity theft, including medical and tax-related, and contains advice for people who have been notified that their personal information was exposed in a data breach.

Identity theft has been the top consumer complaint reported to the FTC for the past 15 years, and in 2014, the Commission received more than 330,000 complaints from consumers who were victims.

June 12th, 2015|Educational Series|

Florida court allows FCRA suit against Whole Foods to move forward

Reinforcing the importance of complying with even the most technical FCRA requirements, a federal court in Florida allowed a former employee to move forward with his suit against Whole Foods Market Group.

In the putative class action, the plaintiff, who was terminated in June 2013 after the employer conducted a background check on plaintiff and other existing employees, charges that Whole Foods violated the FCRA, and specifically, points to the forms the plaintiff signed when he applied for employment. A “Disclosure Statement” provided: “By this document

[Whole Foods] discloses to you that a consumer report regarding your credit history, criminal history and other background information and/or an investigative consumer report containing information as to your character, general reputation, personal characteristics and/or mode of living may be obtained from personal interviews or other sources in connection with your application for any purpose at any time during your employment.”

The plaintiff was also given a “Consent and Release of Information” form, which stated: “I further understand and authorize [Whole Foods] or those authorized by them to procure a consumer report on me as part of a process of consideration as an employee … I release all parties from liability for any damages which may result from the disclosure of any information outlined herein.”

Although Whole Foods intended for the Disclosure Statement to satisfy Section 1681(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA and each form was a separate single page document, the simultaneous presentation of the consent form rendered the disclosure meaningless, the plaintiff argued. Whole Foods knew that it was required to provide a stand-alone form, the plaintiff added, citing FCRA-related articles posted online by the third-party the company used to run the background checks.

The court agreed. “Based on the allegations, with all inferences drawn in favor of plaintiff, if both the disclosure and the consent forms combined and read as one document with the waiver and release included simultaneously with the disclosure, the complaint states a claim for relief,” the judge said, denying Whole Foods’ motion to dismiss the suit. The court also allowed the plaintiff’s contention that Whole Foods “willfully” violated the FCRA to move forward. Under the statute, reckless and knowing violations constitute willful violations, the court noted, and the plaintiff presented sufficient allegations that the defendant knew it was required to provide a stand-alone form separate from the employment application and yet failed to do so.

“The allegations that defendant had access to legal advice and guidance from the FTC yet it knew that its conduct was inconsistent with that guidance and the plain terms of the statute, are sufficient to withstand attack at this stage of the proceedings on a motion to dismiss,” the judge wrote.

The decision provides an important reminder to employers that class actions alleging technical violations of the FCRA, particularly Section 1681(b)(2)(A)(i), remain popular with plaintiffs with statutory damages from $100 to $1,000 for a willful violation available.

Whole Foods is facing an identical suit in California federal court while other companies have settled similar cases for significant amounts, such as the recent deal Publix Super Markets struck with a class in Tennessee federal court for $6.8 million, a $2.5 million payout by Domino’s Pizza, and a settlement agreement for $3 million between grocery chain Food Lion and job applicants.

Read the court order here.

June 12th, 2015|Employment Decisions, FCRA, Judgment|

U.S. Supreme Court case offers window into CFPB’s position on the FCRA

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a closely followed case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) that will have great significance on privacy law. In connection with this case, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) offered a glimpse of its stance on the FCRA in an amicus brief recently filed with the U.S. Supreme Court.

In 2012, the Bureau took over the enforcement reins of the FCRA from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Since then, the industry has watched for signs on how the Bureau would tackle its new job, with few clues. But in an amicus brief filed jointly with the Solicitor General in Spokeo v. Robins, the CFPB weighed in, taking a consumer-friendly position on the statute.

The dispute began when Robins claimed that Spokeo ran afoul of the FCRA. The spokeo.com site allows users to obtain information about other individuals like address, phone number, employment information, and economic data such as mortgage value and investments. Robins sued after finding incorrect information about himself on the site, alleging that Spokeo was a consumer reporting agency (CRA) under the FCRA and sold “consumer reports” but failed to comply with the various statutory requirements by neglecting to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information reported on its site and failing to provide notice of statutory responsibilities to purchasers of its reports.

Relying on Section 1681n of the FCRA, which grants consumers a cause of action against an entity that negligently or willfully violates “any requirement imposed

[under the FCRA] with respect to [that] consumer,” Robins filed a putative class action. A federal district court dismissed the suit for a lack of standing but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The federal appellate panel held that Robins sufficiently alleged an injury in fact because Congress created a right of action to enforce a statutory provision, demonstrating intent to create a statutory right.

Spokeo petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case. The CFPB filed the amicus brief, siding with the plaintiff and arguing that the justices should deny the writ of certiorari. The Bureau argued to the Court that the statutorily created cause of action found in the FCRA satisfied the injury required for Article III standing. While recognizing that Congress does not have unlimited power to define the class of plaintiffs who may sue in federal court, the CFPB said the legislature “may grant individuals statutory rights that, when violated, confer standing, and the clear language of the FCRA did just that.”

“FCRA thus grants an individual consumer a statutory entitlement to be free from a CRA’s actual dissemination of inaccurate information about him when the CRA fails to employ ‘reasonable procedures’ to assure the information’s accuracy,” according to the CFPB’s brief. A CRA’s willful failure to follow reasonable procedures to ensure that an accurate report about a consumer is disseminated violates a ‘requirement imposed under [FCRA] with respect to [that] consumer.’ It is also a concrete and particularized injury to the consumer because it involves the actual, specific, and non-abstract act of disseminating information about the particular consumer.” This reading – recognizing a legally protected interest in consumer privacy – “is particularly salient in modern-day society given the proliferation of large databases and the ease and rapidity with which information about individuals can be transmitted and retransmitted across the Internet,” the CFPB added, as “public dissemination of inaccurate personal information about the plaintiff is a form of ‘concrete harm’ that courts have traditionally acted to redress, whether or not the plaintiff can prove some further consequential injury.”

Read the CFPB’s amicus brief in Spokeo v. Robins here.

Read the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here.

June 12th, 2015|FCRA, Judgment|

New law limits credit checks for New York City employers

New York City has joined the growing list of employers placing limits on credit checks. On April 16, the City Council overwhelmingly voted in favor of a bill prohibiting the use of credit checks in most employment situations. Mayor Bill De Blasio signed the legislation on May 6, amending the city’s Human Rights Law to make the use of credit history for hiring and other employment purposes, with certain exceptions, an unlawful discriminatory practice. Set to take effect on September 3, 2015, the law will have a sizable impact on employers in New York City. A review of current policies and procedures to determine if any exceptions apply is key, while employers with a statewide presence should consider whether to continue credit checks in other locations where they remain legal.

As defined by the law, “consumer credit history” means an individual’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or payment history, as indicated by: (a) a consumer credit report; (b) credit score; or (c) information an employer obtains directly from the individual regarding (1) details about credit accounts, including the individual’s number of credit accounts, late or missed payments, charged-off debts, items in collections, credit limit, prior credit report inquiries, or (2) bankruptcies, judgments or liens. The law further provides that “a consumer credit report shall include any written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or credit history.”

Importantly, employers are prohibited not just from the request or use of credit history for applicants, but also from using credit history as a factor in employment decisions for current employees in “compensation, or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”

When initially introduced, the proposal featured no exceptions to the ban on credit checks. But over the course of the past year, limited exceptions were added to the bill. As enacted, the legislation permits the use of credit checks for prospective employees of broker-dealers who must register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) as well as for police officers and other public officials in a position involving a “high degree of public trust.” Additional exceptions allow a review of credit history when required by state or federal law or regulations; for positions when an employee must possess a security clearance or has “regular access” to intelligence or national security information; for non-clerical positions with access to “trade secrets;” for computer security positions when the employee’s duties include the ability to modify digital security systems; and for employees with signing authority over third-party funds or assets greater than $10,000 or fiduciary responsibility to an employer with the authority to enter into financial agreements of $10,000 or more.

The law permits individuals to file a complaint of discrimination with the New York City Commission on Human Rights within a one-year period or a complaint in court, with a three-year statute of limitations. Remedies include back pay, reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.

New York City joins 12 other jurisdictions that have prohibited credit checks in employment-related decisions, including the city of Chicago as well as California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.

Read the New York City legislation here.

June 12th, 2015|Legislation|

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